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Mobile phones are considered to be the most common communication devices in history.  Recently, 
mobile phones are not only used for casual greetings but also, sending and receiving important data 
such as, social security numbers, bank account details and passwords. Public key cryptography is a 
proven security solution, which can be used to secure the mobile communications. Several researchers 
have proposed server-based architectures public key cryptography solution to secure the mobile 
communications. Third party servers were used to check the certificates, authenticating the 
communicating parties, key distribution, etc. This paper proposes and implements a non-server (that is, 
P2P), architecture public key cryptography to secure the mobile communications. The proposed 
implementation of public key cryptography can provide confidentiality, authentication, integrity and 
non-repudiation security services needed for mobile communication. Compared with server based 
architecture, non-server based architecture has lower risk and the security has been improved, to avoid 
many kinds of attacks. 
 
Key words: Public key cryptography, NTRU, peer to peer, confidentiality, authentication, integrity and non-
repudiation, mobile communication security. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Today, mobile phones are considered to be the most 
common communication devices in history. The demand 
for such device is tremendous, as in, the second quarter 
of 2009, there were more than 4.3 billion mobile 
subscribers worldwide compared to 3 billion mobile 
subscribers in 2008 and 2.5 billion mobile subscribers in 
2007 (GSMWorld, 2009a). The majority of them are 
sending and receiving SMS texts, or making calls, it is 
sometimes used to exchange sensitive information 
between communicating parties. In some cases however, 
this data may also include very private information 
reserved for the personal viewing of the legal recipient. 
 
 
 
*Corresponding author. E-mail: gazimalamb@yahoo.com, 
gazi.alam@um.edu.my. Tel: +  603-7967 5077. Fax: + 603-
7967 5010. 
Some mobile networks such as GSM networks use 
different security algorithms called A3, A5 and A8. An 
A3/A8 algorithm is implemented in the Subscriber Identity 
Module (SIM) cards and in the GSM network 
authentication centers. The A5 encryption algorithm 
scrambles the user's voice and data traffic between the 
handset and the base station to provide privacy; the 
algorithm is implemented in both the handset and the 
base station subsystem (BSS) (GSMWorld, 2009b).In 
September 2003, a group of researchers introduced a 
practical cipher text-only cryptanalysis for GSM encrypted 
communication, and launched active attacks on the GSM 
protocols. They describe a cipher text-only attack on A5/2 
that merely requires a few dozen milliseconds of 
encrypted off-the-air cellular conversation to find the 
correct key in less than a second on a personal computer 
(Barkan et al., 2008). It is clear that the transmitted data 
through   the   mobile   networks    is    unsecured.    GSM 
  
 
 
 
networks were not designed to transmit sensitive 
information. Therefore, security was not considered in its 
implementation (Zhao et al., 2008). As the amount of 
products and services offered via the Internet grows 
rapidly, privacy, copyright and security are very important 
issues (Abomhara et al., 2010; Ahmed et al., 2010, Alam 
et al., 2010). 
Nowadays, the visibility of security applications is wide 
(Zaidan et al., 2010g); the term security, presented in the 
scholar papers, side by side, with terms; confidentiality, 
integrity, authenticity, non-repudiation, privacy and data 
protection (Nabi et al., 2010). It may not be exaggerating 
if we say e-life equal to security, researcher state many 
words on the role played by security on the life.  Raad et 
al. (2010), Yass et al. (2010), Zaidan et al. (2010a, b, c) 
say “only protected transaction, have significant impact 
on consumers’ perception about e-banking security. 
Zaidan et al. (2010d, e, f), Hmood et al. (2010) said 
“Privacy and security are very important issues being 
discussed in the literature, on the current use of ICT”. 
Public key cryptography is a proven solution, which can 
be used to secure mobile communications. The usage of 
public key cryptography can provide the confidentiality, 
authentication, integrity and non-repudiation security 
services needed to secure mobile communications. Due 
to the limitation of the mobile devices resources, 
implementing a public key cryptography solution to 
secure peer to peer communication has become a 
challenge. This paper proposes an alternative solution to 
secure the peer to peer mobile communications in 
regards to confidentiality, authentication, integrity and 
non-repudiation security services. The proposed solution 
is developed and tested on the real mobile phone 
devices.  
 
 
Research objectives 
 
The objectives of this research work are: to identify the 
appropriate technique for peer-to-peer mobile 
communications security; to propose an alternative 
solution for securing mobile communications; to develop 
and test the proposed technique in regards to 
confidentiality, authentication, integrity and non-
repudiation services. 
 
 
Research questions 
 
1. What are the current end-to-end mobile 
communication security solutions weaknesses? 
2. How can we develop the end-to-end mobile 
communication security solution which guarantees the 
confidentiality, integrity, authentication and non-
repudiation security services? 
3. How can we provide the end-to-end mobile 
communication security without depending on mobile 
network operator or third party? 
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4. How can we develop a solution for end-to-end mobile 
communication security that is implementable by 
individuals as well as by the commercial ones?  
 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
In this paper, we initiated with overview, the current 
mobile communication security solutions, and discussed 
the challenges of public key cryptography implementation 
in non-server architecture, followed by a proposed mobile 
security solution. This solution implements public key 
cryptography in non-server architecture.  Finally, we 
discussed the proposed solution security and the 
potential risks.  
This research is conducted in four phases as organized 
further: 
 
 
Phase one 
 
1. Current solutions. 
2. Public key cryptography in non-server architecture. 
3. Non-server architecture versus server architecture. 
 
 
Phase two 
 
1. Public key cryptography implementation in non-server 
architecture challenges. 
2. Public key generation. 
3. Public keys storage. 
4. Public key distribution. 
5. Senders authenticating. 
 
 
Phase three 
 
1. Proposed scheme for public key cryptography 
implementation in Non-server architecture. 
2. Selected public key cryptography algorithm. 
3. Native Title Research Unit (NTRU) experiment on the 
real mobile phone device. 
4. Authentication problem. 
5. Key exchange session. 
 
 
Phase four 
 
1. Proposed scheme security. 
2. Keys exchange session.  
3. Exchanging encrypted messages. 
 
 
CURRENT SOLUTIONS 
 
Many researches have proposed solutions to secure the 
mobile   phone   communication   by   using    public   key  
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cryptography (Hassinen and Markovski, 2003; Hassinen, 
2006; Kuen, 2008). However, the majority of the solutions 
are server architecture and the mobile operator or service 
provider will control the servers. The servers in such 
architecture are controlling the cryptographic key 
generations (Kuen, 2008; Zhao et al., 2008) and key 
distributions and authenticate the users (Kuen, 2008; 
Jimale, 2008). One of the main reasons for not 
implementing public key cryptography in non-server 
architecture is the restricted resources (that is, computing 
power and storage capacity) in the mobile phone devices. 
The second important reason is the user’s authentication 
scheme. How can the user authenticate the sender entity 
in non-server architecture systems?  
 
 
Public key cryptography in non-server architecture 
 
Non-server architecture versus server architecture 
 
Most of the mobile communications security solutions 
that are based on public key cryptography rely on the 
mobile phone network operator or service provider as 
part of the proposed solutions. Generally, the server 
architecture solutions needs additional hardware (that is, 
servers) and as a result, needs qualified staff to maintain 
the servers. Moreover, server architecture mobile security 
systems user has to get the mobile network operator or 
the service provider’s approval, because it depends on 
their servers. Besides, the overhead cost of 
communication is increased due to users need to access 
the servers in many cases such as uploading and 
downloading the cryptographic keys. We do not expect 
that the mobile operators will provide security services to 
the transmitted data through the SMS service for 
individuals, at least not in the near future. 
On the other hand, non-server architecture mobile 
communications security solutions are implementable for 
individuals due to its independency from the mobile 
phone network operator or service provider. Thus, the 
user does not need to make any agreement with the 
mobile phone network operator or service provider. As a 
result, all the cryptographic operations are achieved on 
the user’s mobile phone. Terms of overhead cost of 
communication is less than server architecture system, 
due to discard in the communication between the user 
and the server. Most of the current non-server mobile 
security systems are based on symmetric cryptographic 
algorithms. For example, CryptoGraf messaging software 
is used to encrypt messages with AES algorithm within 
the mobile phones without requiring any server (Wu and 
Tan, 2009). 
 
 
Public key cryptography implementation in non-server 
architecture challenges 
 
In server architecture mobile phone security system, the 
server   is   used  to  do  two  main  tasks;  managing  the  
 
 
 
 
cryptographic keys (that is, key generation, key storage 
and key distribution) and users’ authentication (Hassinen 
et al., 2006; Jimale, 2008; Wu and Tan, 2009). Thus, in 
non-server architecture, users have to handle these tasks 
by themselves. These tasks are difficult to handle by the 
mobile phone devices because of the fact that most 
popular public key cryptography algorithms, demand a 
high power computing, which is not available in the 
mobile phone devices. Thus, using public key 
cryptography algorithms on the mobile phone will cause 
negative effects on the mobile phone performance (that 
is, slow in response, wasting time) (Kuen, 2008). As a 
result, many of the researchers proposed using a server 
structure for the mobile phone security systems (Jimale, 
2008; Kuen, 2008; Toorani and Shiras, 2008). 
Nevertheless, when the public key cryptography 
operations are achieved on the mobile phone, it will be 
possible to implement the public key cryptography in non-
server architecture mobile phone security systems. 
Further, discussions for the public key cryptography 
operations are achieved by the server. 
 
 
Public key generation 
 
Public key cryptography algorithms require a lot of 
complex calculations and needs high computational 
power, which is not found in most mobile phones. 
Usually, the most cryptographic operation that consumes 
the computing power is the key generation (Jimale, 
2008). To overcome this obstacle, the selected algorithm 
should have a high speed and should not demand high 
computing ability.  
 
 
Public keys storage 
 
In the case of the non-server architecture mobile security 
systems, the number of users will be somehow small, 
furthermore, the number of keys will be a bit limited, and 
thus, it is possible to store the keys on the user's mobile 
phone. The size of the public key for the user does not 
exceed 256 bytes, meaning that one mega byte may 
store more than four thousands keys, thus, each user can 
be satisfied with less than one mega byte. In addition, 
one mega byte storage is not counted, compared to the 
current phone memory sizes (in many cases, exceed 8 
giga byte). Furthermore, most of today’s phones are 
designed to deal with extra memory, thus, the storage 
capacity of the mobile phone is no longer a problem. 
 
 
Public key distribution 
 
In non-server architecture, users have to exchange the 
public keys among them. The users have to request the 
needed key from their partners directly; in this case the 
partners would send their public keys  via  encrypted  and 
  
 
 
 
signed messages. The users can check the originality of 
the received keys by verifying the signature and then 
keep them in encrypted format for later usage. Not until 
this time, there is no need to have access to the server in 
order to get the partners’ keys when needed. The 
problem is in the first communication, when the users 
don’t have their partners’ public keys and as a result, they 
can neither decrypt nor verify the encrypted and signed 
messages. To solve this problem, a key exchange 
session can be used for the purpose of key exchange at 
the first time. 
 
 
Senders authenticating 
 
For authentication purpose, both partners’ have to sign a 
messages that they are going to send with their private 
key. The recipients will be able to verify the signature by 
using the public key which they already received during 
key exchange session. Thus, the users will be able to 
make certain, the identity of the sender within their mobile 
phones, without need to access the third party severs. If 
both communicate for the first time, both will require 
exchanging the keys, using key exchange session.  As 
mentioned earlier, the first time key exchange did not 
reach the level of challenge and the solution is to create 
key exchange session with some additional security 
techniques. 
 
 
Proposed scheme for public key cryptography 
implementation in non-server architecture 
 
In such schemes, there are two main problems; the 
selected public key cryptography algorithm must have 
low demand of power computing to achieve the 
cryptographic operations. We have to find a public key 
cryptography algorithm that can run fast enough on the 
mobile phones and achieve all required cryptographic 
operations without negative effects on the mobile phone’s 
performance; the main problem is how the user can 
authenticate the sender in first contact. In this section we 
discuss the selected public key cryptography algorithm as 
well as the proposed scheme for exchange cryptographic 
keys for first time. 
 
 
Selected public key cryptography algorithm 
 
RSA and elliptic curve cryptosystems (ECC) are 
considered as the most popular public key cryptography 
algorithms. In the literature, they reported many 
weaknesses on RSA, they stated RSA is slow; 
(Kurosawa et al., 1995) RSA is not secure if the same 
message is encrypted to several receivers, to completely 
break RSA one needs to find the prime factors. In 
practice, RSA has proved to be quite slow,  especially  for  
Al-Bakri et al.        933 
 
 
 
key generation algorithm. Furthermore, RSA is not well 
suited for limited environments like mobile phones and 
smart cards without RSA co-processors (Yu et al., 2005), 
because it is hard to implement large integer modular 
arithmetic on such environments. RSA also requires 
longer keys in order to be secure compared to some 
other cryptosystems like elliptic curve cryptosystems 
(ECC). ECC is faster than RSA (Vincent et al., 2010; 
Chung et al., 2007), ECC-160 has 6× smaller key-size 
than RSA-1024 and can generate a signature 12 times 
faster than RSA (Balitanas et al., 2008). ECC is faster, 
and occupies less memory space than an equivalent 
RSA system (Kapoor et al., 2008), ECC generates 
asymmetry keys pair faster than RSA (Alanazi et al., 
2010a, b), ECC is more efficient than the ubiquitous RSA 
based schemes because ECC utilizes smaller key sizes 
for equivalent security (Sriram et al., 2010). Security 
wise, ECC is stronger than RSA (Kute et al., 2009). In 
2009, a new standard was approved for public key 
cryptography called NTRU crypto system. Preliminary 
experimental results show the advantages of NTRU over 
RSA, such as, at similar security level, the key size of 
NTRU is less than a quarter of that of RSA, and the 
speed of NTRU is much faster than that of RSA; the key 
generation is more than 200 times faster (Shen et al., 
2009).  However, when comparing NTRU with RSA and 
ECC, the speedup is large: up to 1300 times faster than 
2048-bit RSA and 117 times faster than ECC NIST-224, 
when comparing the number of encryptions per second 
(or up to 1113 times faster than 2048-bit RSA when 
comparing the data throughput)( Hermans et al., 2010). 
The computation power required by RSA, ECC and 
ElGamal is too high for some applications such as smart 
cards and mobile personal device. These features and 
more, made NTRU forefront on the mobile environment. 
NTRU is the first secure public key cryptosystem not 
based on factorization or discrete logarithm problems 
(Challa et al., 2007). 
The NTRU algorithm was approved by the IEEE in 
February 2009 as a public key algorithm with standard 
1363.1 (NTRUCryptosystem, 2009). Unlike RSA and 
ECC, no successful attack has been recorded to break 
the security of this algorithm (Rahma and Hussein, 2009). 
NTRU provides the same level of security provided by 
RSA, in addition, the most important advantage of this 
algorithm is the ability to work in limited computing 
capability environments. The benefit of using this 
algorithm in the mobile phone devices is that, it works 
efficiently and does not have a bad affect on the 
performance of the mobile phone devices. 
In 2009, made an experiment on the performance of 
enhanced NTRU-251 and compared it with RSA-1024 in 
the mobile java emulator. The results of their experiment 
are shown in Table 1. The results that they got show that 
the time of key generation for NTRU is less 200 times 
that the time of key generation for RSA, and the time of 
encryption   is   almost   3   times   less,  and  the  time  of
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Table 1. Preliminary experimental results (Wu and Tan,2009). 
 
Operation NTRU-251 (ms) RSA-1024 (ms) 
Key generation  9617 2090509 
Encryption  515 1505 
Decryption  1132 35102 
 
 
 
Table 2. NTRU pair keys generation operation test. 
 
Nokia N70 (ms) Nokia N73 (ms) Nokia N93 (ms) Nokia 5800 Xpress music (ms) 
142 77 53 29 
 
 
 
decryption is about 30 times less. Thus NTRU is more 
reasonable for public key cryptography implementation 
on the mobile phone devices. 
 
 
NTRU experiment on the real mobile phone device 
 
Unlike the papers reported in the literature, they used 
java emulator to test the performance of the algorithms; 
we test NTRU in the real mobile devices. In our 
experiment, four of Nokia devices, to test the NTRU 
speed was selected; Nokia N70, N73, N93 and Nokia 
5800 Xpress Music. The Nokia N70 belongs to the 
second generation (2G) of Nokia mobile devices and it 
operates with symbian operating system v8.1a. It has 
ARM9 CPU with a 220 MHz clock rate. In addition, it has 
22MB internal memory and supports extension memory 
from MMC type. Nokia N73 is from the third generation 
(3G) and operates with the developed version of symbian 
operating system, which is Symbian OS v9.1. This model 
has Dual ARM 9 CPU with 220 MHz clock rate. N73 has 
42 MB internal memory and 2 GB Mini SD, as extended 
memory. Nokia N93 which belongs to the third generation 
(3G, has Dual ARM 11 CPU with 332 MHz clock rate. It 
also operates with the symbian operating system v9.1. 
This model has 50MB internal memory and 2 GB Mini SD 
as extended memory. Finally, Nokia 5800 Xpress Music 
which is the most modern among them, belongs to the 
fifth generation (5G), and operates with the Symbian OS 
v9.4. This model has ARM 11 CPU with 434 MHz clock 
rate. It also has 81MB internal memory with 16GB Mini 
SD as extended memory (Nokia, 2009). 
We performed tests on key generation, encryption and 
decryption, as well as signing and verifying operations for 
one hundred times and then calculated the average of 
time required for each operation. The NTRU key strength 
is NTRU 251 which is equivalent to RSA 1024.  Table 2 
shows the key generation operation elapsed time on the 
real equipment. From the results, we noticed that NTRU 
algorithm performed very well on the mobile devices and 
there were no negative effects on the mobile devices’ 
performance due to the small time required for the key 
generation. 
The tests results of NTRU on real equipment such as 
Nokia N70, N73, N93 and Nokia 5800 Xpress Music 
showed that the mobile device was able to achieve this 
operation in less than one second. This is In comparison 
with one of the best SMS security solutions, (Kuen, 2008) 
who applied the PKI on the mobile phone environment by 
using the RSA algorithm. The solution tests were carried 
out on the mobile phone Nokia N95 (ARM 11 Dual CPU 
with 332MHz CPU Clock Rate) to generate RSA pair 
keys with 1024 bit key length. The elapsed time was 
around eighteen seconds. In our test, we used Nokia 
N93, which has the same computing ability to Nokia N95, 
(that is, ARM 11 Dual CPU with 332MHz CPU Clock 
Rate). But the operation, generating NTRUEncrypt pair 
keys with length 251, which is equivalent in security level 
to RSA 1024, is done within 53 ms. This means that, our 
proposed solution is faster by about 340 times than 
Kuen’s solution. 
From the results above, note that NTRU does not 
require high computing ability, which makes it the best 
alternatives for mobile devices. Figure 1 shows the 
proposed public key cryptography implementation in non-
server architecture based on NTRU algorithm. 
 
 
Authentication problem 
 
We proposed to implement public key cryptography on 
the mobile phone by using NTRU algorithm. With NTRU 
public key cryptography, mobile phones will be able to 
achieve all cryptographic operations such as key 
generation, encryption /decryption and signing /verifying 
without relying on the third party’s server. The users will 
also gain the confidentiality, authentication, integrity and 
non-repudiation security services for their mobile phone 
communication. However, the problem of how the 
communicating parties authentic each other appears. 
Although, the problem has been faced in first contact 
only; meaning that when they did not  have  each  other’s
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Figure 1. Non-server architecture mobile security system. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Key exchange session and exchange secret messages. 
 
 
 
public keys. To solve this problem, we proposed to use 
key    exchange   session   to   exchange  the  public  key 
between them. The key exchange session is used in the 
proposed   system.  Diffie-Hellman  algorithm  is  used  to 
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make agreement on a temporary key that is used with 
AES-Rijndael to encrypt the public key and exchange it 
with the partners. 
 
 
Key exchange session 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the key exchange session steps. User 
X can start the key exchange session immediately after 
he/she generates his/her public keys and add Y contact 
information to his/her contacts list. He/she can start the 
key exchange session by calculating the value of A, 
depending on the secretly generated value a, and the 
shared secret parameters g and p (that is, g and p are 
fixed by the mobile application).  
 
A=g^a mod p 
 
He/she then sends the value of A, with request to start 
key exchange session. User Y can reject the session if 
he/she is not ready to go through the key exchange 
session steps. He/she can also accept the request; if so, 
he/she must calculate the value of B depending on the 
secretly generated value b and the shared secret 
parameters g and p and send it back to X with accept 
message. 
 
B=g^b mod p 
 
User X will be able to calculate the value of K once 
he/she receives the value of B from user Y. user Y also 
will be able to calculate same key K, depending on the 
value of A, which has already been received from user X 
in the request message. Thus, users X and Y will obtain 
the same secret key and then, they can use it for one 
time only to encrypt their public key and exchange it. For 
next key exchange session, users can use NTRU public 
keys to encrypt and sign the new cryptographic keys 
before exchanging them.  
 
 
PROPOSED SCHEME SECURITY 
 
Here, we discuss the various stages of the proposed 
solution and the potential risks, furthermore, discuss will 
highlight how to protect the users from risks. The 
proposed scheme has two main stages: the exchange of 
cryptographic keys and the exchange of encrypted 
messages, safely. 
 
 
Keys exchange session 
 
The potential risks lies in assuming that the attacker is 
able to capture the exchanged messages during the keys 
exchange session. To analysis this case, we will focus on 
the keys exchange between two users, X and Y,  and  the  
 
 
 
 
potential risks of intercepting the messages by the 
attacker Z. The first message is the request message for 
the keys exchange. The first message sent from X to Y 
holds the value of A. Assuming that the attacker Z 
manages to capture this message, he/she will be unable 
to obtain the value of key K by only depending on the 
value of A. The second message is the reply message 
which is sent from Y to X. this message is to accept the 
exchange of keys and it contains the value of B. 
Assuming that the attacker Z manages to capture this 
message, he/she will not be able to obtain the value of 
key K because, the value a is kept secret; this value is 
only known by user X, as well as the value of b which is 
kept secret by user Y. In addition, the lack of knowledge 
of Diffie-Hellman algorithm parameters g and p will make 
the calculation of the key K value impossible. The third 
and fourth messages are the encrypted messages using 
the key K and AES-Rijndael algorithm, which hold the 
users' NTRU public keys. Even if the attacker could 
capture the messages, he/she will fail to decrypt them 
and will not know the users’ NTRU public keys because 
of lack of knowledge of the value of key K. 
Moreover, the attacker Z will fail to start a key 
exchange session because of lack of knowledge of the 
Diffie-Hellman parameters and port number; also, the 
solution will reject his request because his contact 
number is not in the contacts list. Therefore, the user will 
be confident after the completion of the keys exchange 
session that the process has been made with the right 
person. In addition, even if the attacker Z successfully 
impersonates one of the parties, he/she will fail to 
complete a successful keys exchange with the other user 
due to lack of knowledge of the Diffie-Hellman 
parameters that are needed to complete the process of 
making agreement on a shred secret key with the other 
user. 
 
 
Exchanging encrypted messages 
 
The key exchange stage is only a temporary stage 
needed only in the first contact between the users. Once 
the key exchange has been successfully accomplished, 
the next stage will start, which is, exchanging encrypted 
messages. This stage is permanent and fixed. At this 
stage, users will be able to send and receive the 
encrypted and signed messages. They will also be able 
to exchange new updates for the current keys in 
encrypted and signed messages.  As a result, they will be 
able to verify the identity of the sender of any message 
and they can ignore any spurious message. Since the 
attacker fails to benefit from any of the captured 
messages during the keys exchange session, in the 
process of violation of the privacy of any party to the 
communication, he will not be able to decrypt the 
captured encrypted messages later.  Thus, we can say 
that the proposed non-server security scheme for  mobile  
  
 
 
 
communications is capable of providing a high level of 
security for users. It guarantees provision of the 
confidentiality, integrity, authentication and non-
repudiation security services. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The demand for mobile security has become increasingly 
important because of the increasing applications, built for 
mobile phone. Besides on that fact, this paper discussed 
the impact of implementing public key cryptography on 
the non-server architecture, in the literature, there were 
several approaches used to implement public key 
cryptography. However, none of these approaches used 
non-server architecture. In this paper, public key 
cryptography implementation for non-server architecture 
mobile security system has been proposed. NTRU 
algorithm is selected for public key cryptography 
implementation. The results for NTRU tests on real 
equipment have been presented. The proposed solution 
security and the potential risks have been discussed. 
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